

Fly-by-Wireless (FBWSS): Benefits, risks and technical challenges

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


DLR Locations and Employees

6500 employees across 29 research institutes and facilities at

14 sites.

Offices in Brussels, Paris and Washington.





Research Areas and Activities



- Research air vehicles
- Cockpit simulators
- → Tower simulator
- Compressor, combustion chamber and turbine test beds
- → Autoclaves
- Material and structural test facilities
- → Ground vibration test facility
- → Wind tunnels*
 - * Predominantly under the auspices of German-Dutch Wind Tunnels (DNW)





Index

- Basic considerations
- Benefits
- Risks
- Conceptual wireless flight control system
- System specification
- -Technical challenges



Basic considerations


- Does it deserve/is it reasonable to incorporate wireless technologies in the next-generation aircraft for flight control purposes?

- Three different parameters to keep in mind at the time of incorporating a new technology on aircraft
 - Efficiency/increase of functional capability Dependability — Reliability / Availability
 Safety
 Security


Cost — Design
 Production
 Operation cost

- Are wireless technologies feasible for airborne safety-critical applications?
 - Which requirements must wireless technologies fulfil in order to be feasible?
- Is a full-wireless flight control system without a backup system feasible?
 - If not, is there any technology for back up that does not devaluate the possible improvements derived from full-wireless flight control?












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FBWSS: Benefits, risks & technical challenges > Oroitz Elgezabal > CANEUS FBW10 > 08/24/2010

<u>Safety</u>


- Civil aviation authorities (FAA & EASA) impose high requirements of safety and reliability on aircrafts






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Time and cost









Time and cost (III)

Withdrawal from service

- Storage
- Recycling

Correct disposal of environment/health threatening substances (Hg, Pb...)
 Challenges - Construction

Classification and proper separation of materials

→ Benefits → No wiring-related activities - Reduction of material mass to be recycled Reduced recycling tasks



Index


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Electromagnetic susceptability



Reduction of mass to be recycled

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Electromagnetic susceptability (II)

- Effects of Electro magnetic interferences on wireless communications
 - Cochannel interference


 interfering signal with the same carrier frequency as the information signal
 - the one of information signal
 - Intermodulation interference

 Interfering signals created by nonlinear components like transistors in analog communication systems
 - Intersymbol interference
 Interfering signal caused by multipath propagation causing different copies of the same symbol reaching at the receiver at different times
 - Near End to Far End Ratio Interference → interference signal from a close device that overrides the signal between base station and a device located away from it
- Derivated hazards
 - Quality of service (QoS) degradation → Increase of bit error rate (BER)

 - Network collapse



Reduction of mass to be recycled ür Luft- und Raumfahrt eV in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft



Electric power supply

- Wireless transmissions' peak power during connection's establishment
 - Multiple connections established periodically = High electric power consumption
- Need of power supply at nodes location

→ Not always possible/desirable → Devaluates benefits associated to FBWSS



Reduction of mass to be recycled

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- Comparison of FBWSS benefits and risks

Advantages	Disadvantages
 Efficiency Weight reduction which implies: Decreased fuel consumption Increased payload capacity Increased flight autonomy New/increased capabilities (indirect) Dynamically reconfigurable FCS Safety Systems self-redundant nature High survivability and resilience Single-point-of-failure avoidance Self-repairing capabilities No wiring-aging-related problems Cost No need of wire routing plans Flexibility against design changes No wiring-related assembly tasks Maintenance, reparation and overhaul Ease of system maintenance Higher system integrity Reduced out-of-operation times Increased scalability Withdrawal from service Simplified disassembly tasks Reduction of mass to be recycled 	Electromagnetic susceptability - Quality of service degradation - Increase of bit error rate - Decreased data transmission rate - Violation of deadlines - Network collapse Security issues related with: - Confidentiality of transmitted data - Rejection capabilities against intrusions - Survivability against jamming signals Power supply - Increased power consumption - Need of power supply at node's location - Not always possible/desirable

Index


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Conceptual wireless flight control system



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- Flight control

Primary flight control •

Roll → Ailerons/Roll spoilers

Axis of motion → Pitch → Elevators
 Yaw → Rudder/Yaw dampers

- Full authority digital engine control (not in the current work)
- Flight computers
- Secondary flight control O
 - Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS)
 - Inner spoilers
 - Inner/Outer flaps
 - Slats
 - Airbrakes

System specification

- Development of requirements in the problem domain
 - Requirements that systems must fulfil in order to accomplish the desired function

→ Conceptual description of the desired system

Airborne, real-time, dependable, wireless distributed sensor and actuator network


- Development of requirements related to:
 - Airborne systems
 - Real-time systems
 - Dependable systems
 - Wireless distributed sensor and actuator networks (WDSAN)



9


System specification (II)

- Development of requirements in the problem domain



System specification (III)

- Development of requirements in the problem domain




FCS: Flight Control System

DLR für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Source: 1) J. Rushby. A comparison of Bus Architectures for Safety-Critical Embedded Systems

System specification (IV)

- Development of requirements in the problem domain





Index

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Technical challenges

- Assessment of the technology to serve as wireless transmission medium

- Physical layer of the ISO OSI standard
- Radio Frequency (RF)

Which frequency spectrum should be used?

Spectrum allocation Vs Spectrum reuse

ISM bands Vs Protected spectrum

Worldwide availability Vs Interference-free/Secure spectrum

COTS systems Vs Proprietary systems

- Free space optics (FSO) → Wireless optical transmission → High inmunity against EMI

 - → Line-of-sight FSO (LoS FSO) → Direct optical connection
 → Non-line-of-sight FSO (NLoS FSO) → Indirect optical connection
- through the use of magnetic fields ISO: International Organization for Standardization

OSI: Open System Interconnection

COTS: Commercial of-the-shelf

EMI: Electro Magnetic Interference



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14

Technical challenges (II)

- Assessment of the need of a backup system
 - In order to be able to design a system without the need of a backup system the following questions must be answered:
 - Does the wireless network have a reliability level appropriate enough? → ≤ 1e-10 /FH
 - \rightarrow Does hardware nodes satisfy the imposed reliability requirements?
 - → Does data link fulfil the imposed reliability requirements?

- Can the wireless network reconstruct itself fast enough (MTTR)?
 - ----- Time between network total collapse and delivery of first command after restart
 - Network collapse detection
 - Restart of the transceivers
 - Network construction
 - Command delivery to primary flight control surfaces

If the answer to one of this questions is "NO" then the use of a backup system is MANDATORY



MTTR: Mean Time To Repair

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Technical challenges (III)

-Possible backup systems

Background idea: Availability of wireless technologies cannot be guaranteed. EMI and jamming can make the use of radio frequency link impossible.

- Assumptions:
 - No cable backhaul connecting the nodes of the flight control network
 - No mechanical backup
- **Power Line communications** Data transmission through aircraft's power supply network

No additional systems Reuse of existing infrastructure -High reliable system Wide availability

- Hybrid networking ---- Data transmission through different wireless technologies/standards

 - Reuse of existing infrastructure
 Dissimilar redundancy Robustness against EMI



16

Thank you for your attention

