

Certi fiable Wireless Data Buses


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Certiifiable Wireless Data Buses

- **Objective: Replace wired avionics data buses with wireless data buses**
 - Can we replace a wired bus such as ARINC 629 with a wireless equivalent?
- **Rationale:**
 - Reduced weight
 - ◆ Translates to lower fuel costs
 - Ease of re-configurability of aircraft
 - Lower installation and maintenance costs



- **Wireless data buses are being used for**
 - **Cabin entertainment systems**
 - ◆ Reduces cost associated with changing seat pitch, seasonal changes in configuration (number of 1st class seats)
 - **Lavatory smoke detectors**
 - ◆ Today airplanes have superfluous wiring to accommodate different configurations used by different airlines
 - **Cargo hold smoke detectors**
 - **Emergency lighting system**

All wireless data buses used today are for non-critical applications

CTQs for Wireless Data Buses for Critical Functions

- **Reliability**
- **Availability**
- **Data integrity**
- **Determinism**
 - Bounded delivery times, low jitter
- **Security**
 - Low susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks (jamming)
 - Authenticated messages
 - Encryption?
- **Non-interference**
 - Must not interfere with existing radios and avionics
- **Bandwidth**
 - Provide bandwidth comparable to modern wired data buses
- **Certifiable**
 - Convince appropriate authorities that system meets above properties

- **Certification is the biggest challenge**
- **Requirements are not well understood**
 - E.g.: “How much” jamming resilience is required?
 - ◆ How is this specified?
 - ◆ How “jamming resistant” are today’s avionics when personal radios are not allowed on board
- **Lack of a good understanding of the faults suffered by wireless networks**
- **Current certification processes may inadequate**
 - Limited to understanding the effects of on-board wireless systems on existing radios and avionics
- **Where in the RF spectrum should these networks operate?**
 - The only globally available frequency band is the 2.4 GHz ISM band
- **Requires a change in the mind-set of the certification authorities**
 - Knee-jerk reaction is to reject anything wireless as being inherently un-certifiable

Designing a Wireless Data Bus

- **Given any dependability and security requirements it is possible to design a wireless data bus that meets those requirements**
 - **Must have sufficient spectrum available**

Commonly Used Techniques for Dependability and Security

- **A combination of techniques will be needed to meet dependability, determinism and security requirements**
- **Different techniques provide tolerance for different kinds of faults and are implemented at different layers of the protocol stack**

Techniques for Jamming Resistance

- **Spread spectrum techniques**
 - Spread energy over larger part of the spectrum
 - Frequency hopping and Direct Sequence Pseudo Noise are commonly used
 - ◆ Time Hop and Transform Domain spread spectrum techniques less common
- **Typically use combination of techniques**
 - Frequency hopping + direct sequence
 - ◆ Permits use of widely spaced bands (hop among bands and spread energy within band)
- **For additional protection, send same bit(s) over multiple frequency hops**
 - Keeps a narrow-band jammer from taking out a part of the communication
- **For Frequency Hopping, hopping sequence must not be guessable**
 - Cryptographic techniques
 - ◆ Can't guess seed of random number generator by observing generated numbers
 - Re-seed all random number generators during scheduled maintenance

Techniques for Reliability, Determinism and Security

- **Physical/Link layer**
 - Bits transmitted over multiple frequency hops
 - **Determinism**
 - ◆ Build on deterministic MAC technology developed by Honeywell
- **Network layer: At least N independent pre-computed routes between any two nodes**
 - Tolerates failures on nodes
 - Build on Honeywell ACS routing protocol that guarantees two independent routes between a data source and a data sink
- **Application layer: Control applications that can tolerate delayed or lost messages**
- **Security**
 - **Needed for authentication and possibly encryption**
 - ◆ Build on Beep-Beep embedded encryption algorithm developed by Honeywell
 - **Aircraft wide-key, changed during scheduled maintenance**

- **Availability of spectrum that can be used world-wide is a problem**
- **Option 1: Work in the 2.4 GHz unlicensed band**
 - Very crowded with consumer electronic devices
- **Option 2: Petition ITU for new spectrum allocation**
 - Very difficult and time-consuming process
- **Option 2: Reassign unused spectrum already allocated for Aeronautical use**
 - **E.g. Microwave Landing Systems (MLS)**
 - ◆ MLS systems are being made obsolete by GPS precision landing systems
 - **Other promising portions of the RF spectrum have been identified**

- **Wireless data buses will be more tolerant of certain faults commonly suffered by wired data buses**
 - **Loose cable connections**
 - ◆ Most common cause of network failure
 - **EMP**
 - ◆ Easier to design EMP protection for wireless data buses

Phased Approach to Deploying Wireless Data Buses

- **Wireless data bus as a backup to a wired data bus**
 - Will help gain experience with the use of wireless for essential functions
- **Replace segments of a wired data bus with a wireless data bus**
 - Use wireless in areas where network reconfiguration would be required when aircraft is reconfigured
 - Use wireless in places hard to reach with wiring
- **All wireless systems**

It's only a matter of time before we see wireless network based critical avionics systems.